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The Argentine Economy - We Should Care What Happened
Market Report
Yr
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 1/11/02
Livestock and Products,
 Average Prices for Week Ending
Slaughter Steers, Ch. 204, 1100-1300 lb
  Omaha, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Steers, Med. Frame, 600-650 lb
  Dodge City, KS, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Steers, Med. Frame 600-650 lb,
   Nebraska Auction Wght. Avg . . . . . . . .
Carcass Price, Ch. 1-3, 550-700 lb
  Cent. US, Equiv. Index Value, cwt . . . . .
Hogs, US 1-2, 220-230 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, US 1-2, 40-45 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, hd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vacuum Packed Pork Loins, Wholesale,    
 13-19 lb, 1/4" Trim, Cent. US, cwt . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 115-125 lb
  Sioux Falls, SD, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Carcass Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 1-4, 55-65 lb
  FOB Midwest, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$78.55
94.83
96.50
121.04
37.00
     *
110.20
72.00
154.00
$62.84
83.60
90.52
103.89
32.00
44.80
91.40
55.00
128.60
$66.07
89.36
93.01
102.79
37.50
*
103.70
60.95
130.27
Crops,
 Cash Truck Prices for Date Shown
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Kansas City, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.44
1.93
4.55
3.65
1.27
2.98
1.94
4.21
3.62
2.29
3.13
1.93
4.24
3.66
2.19
Hay,
 First Day of Week Pile Prices
Alfalfa, Sm. Square, RFV 150 or better
  Platte Valley, ton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Lg. Round, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prairie, Sm. Square, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . . . .
115.00
67.50
100.00
115.00
77.50
105.00
115.00
75.00
105.00
* No market.
Argentina is a country known to many Nebraskans
as a kindred prairie-based producer of beef, corn,
soybeans and wheat -- a friendly but tough customer for
some of our agricultural inputs, a competitor in world
agricultural markets. The collapse of the Argentine
economy is therefore of some interest to Nebraskans.
What happened, and what does it mean for us?
The administration's view of the problems there, as
expressed by Treasury Secretary O'Neill months ago,
seemed to be that the country hasn't tried to develop its
export sector, was fiscally irresponsible and that no
additional international funds should be provided until
these things change. The Argentine export sector is
actually about the same size as for the U.S. (9-10%  of
GNP there vs. 10-11% here), and although Argentine
external debts have been growing, external debt as a
fraction of GNP was growing but not unusual and they
had not defaulted on payments.
Argentine politics are a critical part of this story.  At
mid-century, when per capita incomes were comparable
to those in the U.S., a military coup by Juan Peron
ushered in a brand of nationalistic populism with
protectionist and anti-U.S. sentiments. For forty years
the economy was hampered by slow growth and bouts
of hyperinflation, and politics was plagued by coups.
The Peronists continued to be the majority party, but
after 1990 a new faction wrested control of the party
and under President Menem and economic minister
Cavallo, the economy was opened to greater world
trade and investment, national industries were privat-
ized and the peso was pegged to the dollar at one-to-
one. The convertibility between dollars and pesos was
a crucial element in establishing the confidence neces-
sary for economic investment and growth.
Prosperity ensued. Between 1993 and 1998, annual
growth rates were dramatic: GDP 3.8%; imports from
the U. S. 10%, total imports 12%; agricultural exports
15%, total exports 13%; and foreign direct investment
19%. 
But in 1999 and 2000 the volume and prices of
exports fell (primarily those to Brazil, the largest
trading partner) and GNP began to fall, in a recession
that continued to worsen through 2001. Government
receipts fell while expenditures did not, with public
budget deficits increasing to around 3% of GNP. This
relatively modest level of deficit spending (the deficits
were a lower fraction of GNP than in the U. S. during
later years of the first Bush administration and early
Clinton years) did not pull the country out of recession,
but it did increase foreign debt at the rate of 8-10% per
year at a time when international investors were skittish
and their interest rates were rising. Given the clumsi-
ness of fiscal policy in combating recession, it would
have been desirable to loosen monetary policy (as the
U. S. Federal Reserve has done dramatically in the past
year). But monetary policy was bound in the
straightjacket of convertibility, a pillar of the policy
reform that was strongly supported by the international
financial community. Furthermore, the international
financial community began to demand a balanced public
budget as a condition of further loans, which exacer-
bated the recession and left the government no macro-
economic policy tools other than gimmicks to re-instill
the confidence of consumers and investors. The gim-
micks didn't work. The government did not generate
enough revenue to meet its international and domestic
obligations (even though the latter had been reduced
substantially), international lenders stopped providing
additional loans and the government froze personal
bank accounts to stanch a surge of cash flowing out of
the country.  
Chaos followed when, some say with the encour-
agement of the original populist factions of Peronism,
the public expressed its dismay and disgust by demon-
strations and strikes that forced the exit of President De
la Rua and Cavallo (a fate shared by the other two non-
Peronist governments of the past half-century). The
populist faction of Peronism emerged in control by
early January, with new President Duhalde promoting
a return to earlier policies such as suspension of pay-
ments to foreign lenders in favor of promises of job
creation at home, abandonment of peso-dollar converti-
bility in favor of a two-tiered exchange rate, continued
freezing of bank deposits and involuntary conversion of
dollar deposits to peso deposits. Appeals to the IMF for
new loan advances have continued, however, and it
seems likely that the IMF will belatedly loosen its purse
strings to provide the liquidity necessary for economic
recovery.
With a devalued peso, Argentine agricultural
exports will be cheaper on the world market, making it
a tougher competitor for Nebraska agricultural prod-
ucts. The $15 million of Nebraska goods that Argentina
has been importing annually will diminish drastically
because of their higher cost in devalued pesos. Ne-
braska investors in TIAA-CREF and other funds that
hold Argentine bonds will take a capital loss due to the
devalued bonds. And not least, the U.S. will receive
much less political support from a populist-oriented
Argentine government for our foreign policies such as
those in the Balkans, in the campaign against terrorism
and in promotion of western hemisphere trade agree-
ments. Most of these unfortunate consequences could
have been avoided with a little more visionary policy of
international financial support for our friends and allies.
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